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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LYNNO MATT HARRY,
Case No. 19745

Appellant,
vs.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Director
of Driver License, State of
Utah,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent seeks to have Utah Cod|<e Ann. § 41-2-19.6
(1953) as amended, and effective August 1, 1983, declared as
constitutional on its face and as applied ±|n this case as a civil
public safety statute of the State of Utah/ and as held by the
trial court below.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTl
The district court denied appellant1s petition and
upheld the Department of Public Safety, Driver License Service's
decision subsequent to hearing as not being!arbitrary or
j

:

•••

:.

'•

capricious, holding the civil public safetyjstatute to
constitutional and violative of due process!

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the trial court logic and
decision upheld.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Department and the arresting officer followed the
procedures exactly as set forth in the civil statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-19.6 (effective August 1, 1983).
all relevant statutory citations.

See addendum for

At the time of arrest, the

petitioner was "personally served" with a Uniform DUI Citation on
which was contained the words "NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND."

The

citation specifically warned the individual that 31 days from the
date of "this notice" the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in
the State of Utah would be suspended pursuant to the cited
section.

"You have the right to request a hearing on this

suspension.

The Department will not contact you further

regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing.
YOUR WRITTEN REQUEST must be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the
date of arrest to the office of Driver License Services . . .
"Upon your written request for a hearing you will be notified of
a time and place to appear.

If you fail to appear or request a

hearing your driver license suspension will be automatic.

The

administrative hearing is civil in nature and does not satisfy
the requirement for your to appear in court as indicated above."

-2-

The written notice was given on kn official numbered
departmental form as required by statute.

The driver obviously

received it as Mr. Harry requested an opportunity for a hearing
and was granted a hearing by agreement of j:he parties on.

The

hearing examiner gave Mr. Harry an opportunity to testify and
challenge the two statutory issues that he would determine.

His

testimony on actual physical control of the vehicle was
corroborated by the information contained on the Uniform DUI
Summons inf ormation,-and the official notarized and sworn to
report by the police officer.

Mr. Harry did not contest the

breathalyzer test results of .10% BAC nor the officer's sworn
statement that he was (1) sitting in the "driver's seat", (2)
with the keys "in the ignition", and (3) in the "on position."
R. 12, DUI Report Form.

The driver, in fact, admitted that he

was sitting in the vehicle,
have been moved."

R. 12, and admitted "yes, it could

T. 27.

The hearing examiner considered l^is testimony and its
believability as well as the reports and otjher facts and
circumstances to make his decision. T. 27, (2 8.

Based upon the

evidence and testimony received at this hea|][ring, he found that
the officer had sufficient reason to believ

the driver was in

violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-44 and that the driver did have a .08%
or greater BAC test results.

The only thing that Mr. Harry

choose to challenge at the hearing was whet her or not he was in

-3-

actual physical control.

T. 17.

However, after his opportunity

for hearing, the prior served "Notice of Intention to Suspend"
and letter of 90 day suspension effective on the 31st day from
the arrest and subsequent to the hearing, was sustained by the
hearing examiner.

T. 9.

At the trial the Court considered two issues.

(1) The

constitutionality of the statute and the due process that was
rendered; and (2) whether or not the hearing examiner or the
Department of Public Safety was arbitrary or capricious. T. 32,
36, 38.

Appellant offered exhibits of a two-month prior letter

requesting 200+ blank subpoenas.

It was dated more than two

months prior to the date of the hearing before the Department.
The exhibits were denied admission by the Court, as well as was
respondent's offer to submit the departmental policy to allow
subpoenas to individuals for officers and the subpoena forms
prepared by the Department for use by drivers in specific
hearings.

T. 41 (See addendum for offered forms).
The verdict of the criminal trial was not before the

hearing examiner, and not admitted by the district court. (T. 24)
INTRODUCTION
The destruction of life and property caused by drunk
drivers has long been recognized as a major national problem.
Alcohol is responsible for an estimated annual economic loss of
$21 to $24 billion, and at least 50 percent of all highway

-4-

deaths.

Presidential Commission on Drunk driving. Final Report

(Nov., 1983) p. 1.

Exhibit A.

Utah's problem is equally severe^

In 1980, 150 people

lost their lives in alcohol related accidehts.

Recommendations

of the Governor's Commission on Drinking and Driving (Nov. 5,
1982) p.6.

Exhibit B.

With property damage, injury and death

caused by alcohol the economic and social loss to Utah alone is
staggering —

in Utah the estimated economic damage is

$20,385,000 lost because of alcohol caused deaths alone in just
1981.

Id.

Add the 263 deaths for 1982 and 283 for 1983 and the

Utah death toll alone for three years staggers to an economic
loss of around $94,095,000.

The majority ( 73.2%) of the driver's

contributing to alcohol related fatal accidents had a blood
alcohol content much greater than the .08% Mtah standard.

The

average blood alcohol content of drivers kiplied was .14%.
(Statistics for 1983.)
1, 1984) p. 27.

Utah Traffic Accidelnt 1983 Summary (July

Exhibit C.

In an effort to curb the problem lof drunk driving and
thus lessen economic losses and save pain s^Offering and lives,
Utah and many other states have enacted law s which deal with
alcohol impaired drivers swiftly and efficiently through a civil
administrative driver license suspension process rather than '
through the slower criminal process.

•5-

POINT I
THE STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND SHOULD
BE PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL BY THIS COURT
Petitioner merely alleges the unconstitutionality of
the new statute, however, the Utah Supreme Court grants a strong
presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional.
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981).

See

The cases also

suggest that the petitioner will have to make a clear showing
that the statute is unconstitutional on its face or that it
cannot be constitutionally implemented.
Under this presumption, the Utah Supreme Court in Utah
Farm Bureau v. Utah Insurance Guarantee Assoc.. 564 P.2d 751, in
challenging the constitutionality of the Insurance Guarantee
Association Act, quoting Pride Club v. State, 408 U.S. 238, 92
S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) said that, "this court makes
every reasonable presumption in favor of constitutionality and
will not nullify a legislative enactment unless it is clearly and
expressly prohibited by the constitution."

Utah Farm Bureau,

supra at 753.
The Utah court further said in the case of Sims v.
Smith, 571 P.2d 586, challenging a criminal penalty statute
quoting from the case of Pride Club v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481
P.2d 669 (1971), that ". . • a statute should be held valid
unless there is a clear, complete and unmistakeable violation of
some specific provision of the constitution."

-6-

The court also in

quotes said that this principle of a presumption of constitutionality was so basic that it "mn&l be observed in deciding the
matter."

(Emphasis added.)

The court obviiously meant what it

said, as in Pride ClubF it struck an obviously unconstitutional
phrase to cure a constitutionally infirmed statute.

See also In

Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1981), where!the court said, "It is
the duty of this court to construe a statute to avoid
constitutional infirmities whenever possible.
mn£££,

12 Utah 2d 83, 363 P.2d 71 (1961).T

Cf. Munsee v.

The Utah court also

quoted the same language from the United States v. Delaware and
Hudson Company, 213 U.S. 366, 407, 29 S.Ctj 527, 535, 53 L.Ed.
836 (1909) .
Further we submit that the statute is constitutional on
its face as it complied with the constitutional requirements in
that it provides the individual with reasonable notice and an
adequate opportunity for hearing prior to kny action being taken,
in a civil matter, with a civil privilege tfo drive.

See Greaves

V, State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974), Mackey jv. Montrym. 443 U.S.
at 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2618, stating that "something less than an
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative
action."

Quoting Dixon v. Lovef 431 U.S. 1]05, 113, 97 S.Ct.

1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977).

The Supreme Court also seemed

to uphold a system and reach down into the appellate level of
Illinois and reversed an appellate court decision excluding a
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police

officer's affidavit that did not specify the grounds which

led him to believe that the respondent was driving while under
the influence of alcohol.
petitioner's argument.

Such seems to be the thrust of this

In Illinois v. Batchelder, id., the Court

said, "Indeed it is the affect of the appellate court's opinion
on the Illinois effort to halt this carnage that has prompted our
summary action in this case. . . . Clearly then, the fact that
11-501.1 (d) provides for a predeprivation hearing abundantly
weighs this second part of the Eldridge analysis in favor of the
constitutionality of the Illinois implied consent scheme."
(Emphasis the Court).

The Illinois system allowed the admission

of the affidavit of the police officer in a criminal case and
this was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.
POINT II
UTAH'S DUI LAWS SATISFY DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES
In the tradition of according the "states great leeway
in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and
safety," the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the
prompt civil laws requiring revocation of driving privileges.
Mackey v. Montrym. 443 U.S. 1

99 S.Ct. 2612, (1979).

In Mackey

v. MontrymF the Court upheld Massachusetts' implied consent
system under which the petitioner's driver license was revoked
for refusing to take a breath test.

In analyzing the

constitutional sufficiency of the Massachusetts' system, the
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Court, following the balancing tests in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), considered three factors in holding that the
prehearing revocation and the due process question.

It

considered (1) the nature and weight of th4 private interest at
stake — t h e driving privilege; (2) the ri^k of erroneous
deprivation, and value of alternative procedural safeguards; and
(3) the governmental function, state interest, and administrative
or fiscal burdens at stake.
A.

Private Interest is Minimal and
Statefs Interest is Great

In considering the first and third of these three
factors, the Court recognized that drivers do have an interest in
their licenses.

Mackey, jLd. at 12.

It also recognized the

substantial governmental interest, as discdissed above, in
promptly removing impaired and dangerous dr;ivers from the road,
and keeping them off through an efficient administrative process.
Id. at 17-19.
The Utah Operator and Chauffeur1 si License Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 41-2-1 (n) and (o) (1983), as amended, defines a
driver's "license" as a privilege, and evidence of a privilege to
drive in the State of Utah.

It is a privil^ege that is

constitutionally protected in the State of Utah, Ballard v»
Statfir 559 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979), however, a driver "does not
have a constitutional right to drive an autfpmobile upon the
public highways (particularly so, when he h&s been drinking
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alcoholic beverages.)

The right to drive upon the highv ays is a

privilege conferred subject to conditions; and it may be revoked
if those conditions are violated."
P.2d 1332, 1333.

Smith v. COY (Utah 1980)f 609

Hence we see this Court has held, as have

virtually all courts in the Nation, that the privilege to drive
is not as fundamental as life or liberty, and that the
privilege's nature, and weightiness is not so fundamental as to
require an "error free" determination.

See Gree.nholtz v.

Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2103, not
requiring the full penalopy of process, and Mackey v. Montrym,
(U.S. S.Ct.) inLCja. . ':'In Hiding v. Dirkswater, 366 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983),
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in holding that the statutory
section mandating suspension of a driver license before failure
of a chemical test by registering an alcohol content of .10 BAC
or more was not violative due process, set the example for other
states, by comparing its Minnesota system with the Massachusetts
system using the comparison in Mackey v. Montrym.

That Court

held on page 60 that "the private interest effected here is the
same as in Montrym," and considered the (1) duration of the
revocation, (2) the availability of hardship relief and (3) the
availability of prompt post-revocation review.
Tn Til inn-is v. Batnhplder, 103 S.Ct. 3513 (1983),

another implied consent case, the court weighed the extent of the
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private privilege.

As in Utah, under the Suspension system at

issue in Batchelder, a driver could request a hearing, and, as in
Utah, the driver license would not be suspended until after an
adverse hearing decision.
prior to the hearing.

In Mackey, the Suspension occurred

Thus, the Batcheldej: court explained that

"in Mackey, our concern centered on 'ft]hejduration of any
potentially wrongful deprivation of the property interest.1" JLd.
at 3516.

However, because under the Illinois system, unlike the

Massachusetts system> a driver could not Ipse

his license until

after the requested hearing, the court concluded that the
"respondent can seek no solace in the first step of the Eldridge
analysis."

Id.

The court concluded that the driver in

Batchelder had little or no interest at stake because he retained
his license, unaffected prior to the hearing.
As in Batchelder, a driver licence is not suspended
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 until after the requested
hearing.

Because of this, the duration of the wrongful

suspension that concerned the Mackey Court is non-existent and
the driver's interest minimal.
The third prong of the Montrym/EJJdridge balancing test,
the governmental interest has partially be^n discussed above.
The governmental interest includes the devastating economic loss
and loss of life for which alcohol-impaireq drivers are
responsible and the corresponding interest in remedying the
problem.
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The governmental interest also encompasses the method
of the remedy.

That is, the state has a great interest in, for

example, keeping its officers on the roads instead of in court or
at hearings.

It also has an interest in the "fiscal and

administrative burden" that would be imposed using other
remedies.

Mackey, supra, at 18.

Thus, the Mackey Court

recognized that states have a substantial interest in promptly
removing impaired and dangerous drivers from the road and keeping
them off through an efficient administrative procedure.

2d. at

17-19.
B. The Utah System Minimizes the
Chance of Erroneous Deprivation.
Analyzing the second leg of the Eldridge balancing
test, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Montrym court found
that the flexible due process clause does not require a perfect
error-free standard.

The Court stated:

The Due Process Clause simply does not mandate
that all governmental decision making comply
with standards that assure perfect, error-free
determinations. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Ppnal
Inmatesf supra at 7. Thus, even though our
legal tradition regards the adversary process
as the best means of ascertaining truth and
minimizing the risk of error, the "ordinary
principle" established by our prior decisions
is that "something less than an evidentiary
hearing is sufficient prior to adverse
administrative action." Dixon v. Lovef supra,
at 113. And, when prompt post deprivation
review is available for correction of
administrative error, we have generally
required no more than that the predeprivation
procedures used by designed to provide a
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reasonable reliable basis for concluding that
the facts justifying the official action are
as a responsible governmental official
warrants them to be. See, e.g. Barry v.
Barchir post, at 65-66; Mathews vj Eldridger
424 U.S. at 334.
Id. at 13.

Thus, in considering the second prong of the Eldridge

test, the nature of the administrative suspension system should
be examined, as should the nature of relief from or judicial
review of an adverse agency decision.

Both must be weighed and

balanced against the governmental interest!in health, safety, and
welfare and administrative and financial burdens.
As the U.S. Montrym decision stated, the Due Process
Clause standard does not require an "error-[free" agency decision.
So long as prompt judicial review of the suspension decision is
available, it does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to
the suspension of an individual's driver license.

Dixon v. Love

Id.
In Utah, prompt judicial relief irom suspension
decision is available.

Under Section 41-2-|l9.6 (5) , Utah Code

Ann. (1953) as amended, (see addendum) drivers may file a
petition to the reviewing court within 30 days after the
suspension.

Not only is relief prompt, but the chance that the

license of a driver, operating a vehicle, with a BAC of less than
.08% will be suspended is almost non-existent.
minimized by:

The risk is

(1) the police department check; (2) it is an

organized official form that must be sworn to and mailed in

-13-

promptly; (3) public safety reviews of the record; (4) an
opportunity to testify at a hearing, (5) prompt review by any
"court of record11 in the driver's "county" of residence, and (6)
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court*
Utah's administrative license suspension system even
further protects drivers against the risk of erroneous
deprivation.

Unlike the system at issue in Montrym, in Utah a

driver license is not suspended until after the driver has been
afforded an opportunity for a hearing.

Although the Constitution

does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to adverse
administrative action, Montrym, jLd. at 13, at the hearing in
issue competent evidence was taken.

Documentary evidence was

examined, and, importantly, the driver testified supporting parts
of that sworn document.
The documentary evidence taken into account at the
hearing consisted primarily of the DUI Uniform Citation and the
DUI Report Form.

These reports are required by the statute, on

forms only approved by the Department of Public Safety and sworn
to and must be returned promptly (5 days), and become part of
their official records.

T. 26 and Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6(3)

and (4). These documents are trained officer's reports which are
obtained by the Department of Public Safety through the ordinary
and regular and only business channels.

The documents contain

information regarding the cause for the arrest, the arrest and

the officer's contact with the driver aftef the arrest.

The DUI

report form must be sworn to by the arresting officer, notarized
and checked again requiring another "authorized endorsing
signature."
Administrative reliance on documents similar to these
trained officer's reports was upheld by th^ Montrym Court without
the requirement of correlative officer testimony.
Batchelder, id.)

(See also

Characterizing the information contained in

such reports as "objective" and obtained by a "trained observer
and investigator", JLcU at 13 and 14, the Mcbntrym Court found it
easy to uphold the Massachusetts system which predicated license
revocation on documentary evidence alone.

The Court explained

that the officer's report was sufficient evidence on which to
base the license revocation because:
The District Court, in holding|that the Due
Process Clause mandates that an Opportunity for a
further hearing before the Registrar precede a
driver's suspension, overstated frhe risk of error
inherent in the statute's initial reliance on the
corroborated affidavit of a law Enforcement
officer. The officer whose report of refusal
triggers a driver's suspension i^ a trained
observer and investigator» He is, by reason of
his training and experience, well suited for the

role the statute accords him in the presuspension
process. And, as he is personally subject to
civil liability for an unlawful arrest and to
criminal penalties for willful misrepresentation
of the facts, he has every incentive to ascertain
accurately and truthfully report the facts. liie
specific dictates of due process must he shaped hy
"the risk of error inherent in the truth finding

process as applied to the generality of cases"
rather than the "rare exceptions*" Mathews v.
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Eldridge,. . • And, the risk of erroneous
observation or deliberate misrepresentation of the
facts by the reporting officer in the ordinary
case seems insubstantial* (Emphasis added.) id.
at 14.

Thus, because of the obvious r e l i a b i l i t y of the o f f i c e r ' s sworn
report in the "general" cases, the Supreme Court upheld the
Massachusetts1 implied consent system which prefaced license
revocation solely on the officer's report.
Bolstering their position, the Court noted that
Montrym, like most drivers, "did not dispute the facts" contained
within the officer's report.

Id. 2612.

Similarly, most drivers

in Utah who request a hearing pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6 do
not dispute the factual accuracy of the officer's report, nor
make preparations to have him present in advance.

Rather, as in

Montrym, they choose to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute under which their licenses may be suspended, complaining
of technical jury-type evidence considerations.

The Montrym

Court used this fact to illustrate the accuracy and reliability
of the officer's report and the need for its use in the general
majority of these cases.
In this case, the petitioner attempted to show at the
hearing, that he was not in "actual physical control" of the
vehicle.

However, the challenge was, apparently, directed at the

legal meaning of "actual physical control" and not the underlying
factual situation.

(Apparent ability to strike was present.
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See

Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 654 (JL982) . This driver
never contended that the keys were not in the ignition. The,,.
officer's report states, nor did the drive)f specifically say,
that the car was not moving, as the report! states.

He, in fact,

admitted to the hearing examiner that the par "could have been
moved."

T. at 17, 26-27.
As in Montrym, on appeal, the petitioner seems to

challenge only the constitutionality of the law and quibble with
the evidence taking process.

He does not challenge even the

meaning of "actual physical control" that was at issue at the
administrative level.

The lack of challenge on factually related

issues, as is true of most cases in which k suspension under Utah
Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 is challenged, supports the yiontrym court's
conclusion, and the conclusion that should be reached here, that
the officer's report is a factually reliable account of a trained
observer and may be used in support of an administrative civil
public safety suspension decision.
Mr. Harry had an opportunity to testify.

The officer's

report and other documentary evidence was not the only evidence
relied on by the department in this case.

The department also

used testimonial evidence; the unbelieved testimony of Mr. Harry,
in support of its suspension decision.

T. 28.

mentioned, much of the testimony supports ihe

As previously

officer's report.

Thus, as does the documentary evidence, th4 testimony actually

-17-

taken in this case also helps to minimize the risk of erroneous
deprivation.
Any risk of erroneous deprivation is also minimized
through requiring the agency to address only relatively simple
issues.

U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6(5) simply requires the department to

determine (1) whether the arresting officer had reasonable cause
to believe that the driver was operating a vehicle under the
influence, and (2) whether the driver1s BAC test results, if any,
indicated a .08% BAC-or greater.

The DUI Report Form and any

other documentary evidence along especially with the driver's
testimony permit ready determination of these two simple issues.
- B e c a u s e

the State of Utah requires the officer's

reports to be sworn, checked and authorized by the chief of
police or his designate, on contemporaneous sworn official
departmental forms which are checked by the Department of Public
Safety, and grants the driver an opportunity for an actual
hearing prior to any effective suspension of the driving
privileges, the risk of erroneous deprivation under Utah's new
DUI laws is slight.

This minimal risk, combined with the added

safeguard of post deprivation judicial review and appeal make
Utah's DUI suspension system constitutionally sound.
C.

Post Deprivation Relief is Significant
and Constitutionally Sufficient.

Although the Montrym Court emphasized the significance
of post-deprivation relief, the source of relief in Montrym was
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administrative (because of the summary prehearing revocation) and
not judicial.

Thus, standards of judicial review were not

directly discussed in Montrym- However, even without specific
guidelines from Montrym, due process in driver license cases is
described as a "flexible standard", and it is evident that the
Utah standard of administrative hearing before any suspension and
judicial review of license suspension decisions is mane than
sufficient.
Section 41-2-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
requires the reviewing court to determine whether or not the
Department's suspension decision was arbitrary and capricious
within 30 days.

Therefore, review is prompt and meaningful.

The Utah Supreme Court has approved the arbitrary and
j

capricious standard.

•

•

•

Utah Department of Administrative Services

Vt Public Service Commission/ 658 p.2d 601 (Ut. 1983)

The

Administrative Services court discussed twd standards of review
which it denoted "arbitrary and capricious, "

Under the first

standard discussed, the agency if afforded great deference.
Under this standard the agency should not be reversed if "there
is evidence of any substance whatever which can reasonably be
regarded as supporting the
omitted.)

determination made." (Citation

Administrative Services/ id. at |609.
This standard was held to provide1 a constitutionally

sufficient level of review by at least threle other Utah district
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courts.

None have held it to be unconstitutional.

See, e.g.,

Williams v. Schwendiman, Third Judicial District Memorandum
Decision, Judge Russon, Civil No. C84-2196, June 12, 1984, S.Ct.
Case No. 20128.

And it has frequently been applied by other

district, judges in examining, and even occasionally reversing as
arbitrary, departmental suspension decisions.

The fact that the

courts have used this standard in reversing departmental
decisions logically demonstrates that it is meaningful.
Other western states, pursuant to their implied consent
laws, afford agency revocation and suspension decision similar
judicial deference.

For example, both Idaho and Colorado limit

judicial review to a review to the agency record, and apply the
"clearly erroneous" or "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review.

See, e.g. Davis v» Colorado Department of Revenue, 623

P.2d 874 (Colo. 1981), Mason v. State, 653 P.2d 803 (Idaho App.
1982).
Although this "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review sufficiently protects the petitioner's due process
guarantee, the Utah Administrative Services court articulated
another "arbitrary and capricious" standard which could also be
employed by a court in reviewing license suspension decisions
with mixed questions of law and fact.
Under the second and stricter standard set forth in
Administrative Service, a court will not uphold an agency

-20-

decision if there is only "evidence of any substance whatever"
supporting the determination.

Rather, the! reviewing court must

determine whether or not the agency decisipn "falls within the
limits of reasonableness or rationality."
Services, jsjipjia at 610.

Administrative

This standard of Reasonableness and

rationalness, which the Administrative Services court denotes as
a standard of arbitrary and capricious review applies to agency
decisions involving mixed fact and law questions. Id. at 6Q9610.
As a practical matter this higheR standard is used by
most reviewing courts even in these simple cases.

That is, "was

the administrative decision reasonable or National."

Thus, if

the reviewing court finds, for example, that the issue of whether
or not the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that
the driver was driving while under the influence is a mixed
question, the court likely will apply the higher "arbitrary and
capricious" standard, substitute its judgment for the fact finder
and review and check the administrative driver license hearing
examiner for reasonableness and rationalness.
Testing the reasonableness and rationality, or the
substance of the departmental suspension decision based on the
agency record is a significant and sufficient form of review.
significant is this form of review that the New Mexico implied
consent scheme even employs it for the revijew of the one year
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So

license revocations for refusal.

State, Department of Motor

Vehicles v. Gober, 513 P.2d 391 (N.W. 1973)r New Mexico Stat.
Section 66-8-112(F) (1978).
concerned,

Where one year revocations are

Utah, on the other hand, graciously grants a de novo

review of the revocation decision.

A form of review affording

the agency fact finder no deference.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-

44.10.
Therefore this Court in Administrative Services grants
drivers two meaningftil standards of review as required under the
statutory "arbitrary and capricious'1 review requirement.

The

first standard, allowing greater agency deference is as other
states have found, constitutionally sufficient.

Even if, this

standard was lacking, Administrative Services makes available a
higher standard of review under which the reasonableness and
rationality of the agency decision is tested.

Both standards

provide drivers, like the plaintiff, whose licenses have been
temporarily administratively suspended, with meaningful judicial
review of the suspension decision.
Taken as a whole, Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 more
than protect the due process rights of drivers, like the
petitioner.

Every driver tested must know he is being granted a

conditional privilege —

conditioned on "safety first."

of erroneous deprivation is slight.

The risk

The documentary evidence

which precipitates any suspension action is promptly completed by
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trained and sworn persons, sworn tof and checked and double
checked in a reliable, objective fashion.

The driver has am

opportunity to obtain a pre-deprivation hearing at which evidence
from every available source may be presented.

Under 41-2-19.6

the driver, through the department, may alpo subpoena the officer
if he believes that the officer's report mky be inaccurate in any
aspect.

The combined available testimony and the reliable

documentary evidence are considered only regarding two relatively
simple issues, and, therefore assure accurate agency decisions.
Then the risk of erroneous deprivation is even further minimized
through post-deprivation relief in the forip of judicial review
and appeal.
When weighed against the individual's interest in his
driving "privileges" and the state's urgent interest in removing
hazardous drivers from the highways, the pi|e-hearing
administrative suspension process more thari adequately protects
drivers' due process rights.
POINT III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION DECISION
WAS BASED ON RELIABLE AND COMPETENT LEGAL
EVIDENCE, THEREFORE NOT REQUIRIjflG THE

PEACE OFFICER'S PRESENCE
The lack of the arresting officer's corroborative
testimony at the administrative hearing serves as the basis of
the appellant's major claims.

The petitioner contends that the
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arresting officer's presence at the hearing was mandatory because
it fulfills two functions.

First, that the officer's presence

would satisfy the requirements of the "residuum rule."

Second,

that his presence would satisfy the petitioner's interest in
cross-examination.
First, although the applicability of the residuum rule
to driving privilege suspension cases is unsettled, in any event
the rule's requirements have been met in this case.

The residuum

rule requires an agency decision to be supported by some
"competent" evidence.

Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall. 636 P.2d 481

(Utah 1981), Qgden Ironworks v» Industrial Commission, 102 Utah
492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942).

In this case, the hearing officer did

rely on "competent" testimonial and hearsay evidence in making
the suspension decision, as was allowed in Zions Cooperative
Merchantile Assoc, v. Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah 1927),
262 P.2d 99.
If the evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule
under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the officer's sworn report,
corroborated or not by testimony, should be competent evidence
upon which a decision could be based.

This Court would have

allowed that evidence under its own rules if it was a proper
exception to the hearsay rule, part of the res gestae, even in
the original case spawning apparently the residuum rule of
evidence.

Garfield Smelting Company v. Industrial Commission, 53
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Utah 133, 178 P.2d 57 (1918).

Of course, this Court has recently

reaffirmed in Sandy State Bank v, Brimhall, jsiiena at p. 4 86,*
"that the technical rules of evidence needj not be applied" in
hearings before administrative agencies and that "hearsay
evidence is admissible in proceedings befote the Industrial
Commission and the Public Service Commission."

The Court in

stating that the findings of fact cannot bp based solely upon
hearsay evidence, but must be supported by! a residuum of "legal
evidence competent in a court of law", musp have meant that any
hearsay evidence under the trustworthiness! and reliability
exceptions to the hearsay rule, corroborated or not, would be
acceptable*

If that is not the rule, we sjibmit that there

appears here, in the interest of public safetyf a 'fsound reason
why the minority residuum rule should" not be applied.

Sandy

State Banfcr Ad.
The officer's report is an exception to the hearsay
exclusionary rule because this is a civil fatter (fiallard yt CQX,
595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (1979)), and the sourc^ of the information
and the circumstances of its preparation indicate
trustworthiness.

See Barney v. Coy, 588 Pl2d 696 (Utah 1978),

allowing hearsay driver license computerized records as
"competent" evidence.

Additionally, a specific exception for

these reports is made under Rule 803(1), because they contain a
first-hand immediate record of the event which is being
perceived*
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They are also admissible under Rule 803(6) as being a
business entry exception or a record of a regularly conducted
activity made at or near the time in the course of business of a
regularly conducted business or institutionf (see also Barney v.
Cox/ .supija) .

They would be "competent" and self-authenticating

under Rule 803(8) as a record and report setting forth an
activity that the declarant has a "statutory duty to report."
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6.
The Utah Supreme Court said in Barney v. Cox, supra, a
driver license records case, "it is the type of evidence which
will be excepted from the hearsay rule, not the type of
organization (i.e. private or public) that is important."

In

that case Justice Hall cited the business entries exception of
Utah Rules of Evidence (Rule 63), and also stated in a footnote
that, "other subsections of Rule 63 may also apply as exceptions
including (15) reports and findings of public officials and (17)
contents of official record."

Barney is cited by the framers of

the Utah Rules of Evidence as being in support of subsection 6 of
Rule 803 and subsection 8 on public records and reports.

Like

the reports in Barney, the reports in the civil proceedings here
are ordinarily and regularly obtained by the Department from an
individual trained to observe and gather the urgently needed
information in an objective and reliable manner.

Montrym, SUBLSL*
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Mackey v.

The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the admissibility of
official records and sworn reports for substantive proof not^only
in Barney Vt Coxr .supra but also allowed a sworn official
toxology report in Yacht Club v, Liquor Control Commission 681
P.2d 1224/1227, .supra.

Also in Murray City v, Hall, 663 P.2d

1314 (Utah 1983) , a criminal case, this Court held that even
though the results of the breathalyzer test were erroneously
admitted, as a rule the test results (and the machine testing
technician's affidavit) are admissible if the judge (or hearing
examiner) finds them to be trustworthy und^r U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3.
In that decision Justice Durham logically reasons that:
It is well recognized that the accused right of
confrontation is not absolute. See e.g. State v.
Maestes, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386 (1977). In certain
instances it must yield to legitimate governmental
interest. See e.g. State v, WalkeCr supra, 53
Ohio St.2d at 199, 374 N.E.2d at 136-37. The
enactment of § 41-6-44.3 manifest an intent by the
legislature to relieve the State of Utah and other
governmental entities of the financial hnrd^n and
inconvenience of calling as witnesses in every
DUI case the accuracy of the breathalyzer machine.
(Cite omitted.) Such a concern is a legitimate
governmental interest* Section 41-6-44.3, devised
to further that interest, constitutes a very
limited intrusion upon the accused right of
confrontation, (Emphasis added.) JLd. at 1321.
The Murray City Court went on to point out that if the
accused feels that the machine was not functj:ioning properly
"he/she can subpoena the public officer responsible for testing
the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules."
Anno. § 77-35-14 .

See Utah Code

See also Stroupe Vt CoMionwealthr supra.

Va. 243, 207 S.E.2d 894 (1974)]

The court sjaid:
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Thus, given (1) the legitimate governmental
interest in not having to produce in every DUI
case the public officer responsible for testing
the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules, and (2) the alternative means available to
an accused to cross-examine and confront such a
witness, we hold that § 41-6-44.3 does not violate
the appellant's constitutional right of
confrontation when all of its requirements are
met. See State v. Walker, supra- [53 Ohio St. 2d
192, 374 N.E.2d 132 (1978)3 See also People v.
TenoriQ, 197 Colo. 137, 590 P.2d 952 (1979)
(stating that there is no violation of an accused's right of confrontation where the evidence
is shown to be trustworthy and reliable).
However,^as previously.discussed, the mandate of §
41-6-44.3 was not meir in tne present case.
Therefore/* the. results of the ..breathalyzer test
were erroneously admitted. Id.t at 1322.
Justice Hall, concurring in that decision, wrote that
the affidavit submitted in this case was admissible and did meet
the foundational requirements of the statute. JLcU , at 1322-1323.
This same fiscal need and urgent public right applies to the test
results as well as to the officer's sworn report in this civil
case.
The criminal case of State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1184
(Utah 1983), also proposes that a jciisLil business record may be
admitted irrespective of the type of organization from which it
emanates.

There, Justice Stewart pointed out that police records

(Booking Reports) are admissible depending on the "nature of the
record" and "the purpose for which they are offered."

Even under

this criminal case these sworn police officer reports, required by
the civil statute, meet the business entries "and the like"
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exception to the hearsay rule.

This Court again, in that case

cites Barney v. Cox, £i±gii&r for the statement that "it is the type
of evidence which will be excluded by the hearsay rule, not the
type of organization, i.e. public or private, that is important."
2d. at 1183.

Bertul was a criminal case aind involved a conviction

and a possible jail sentence and should nojt apply in these public
safety cases being "civil cases" involving no possible fine or
jail purposes.

See Ballard v. Cox, 595 P.2d 1302 (1979).

We submit that the officer's swprn report is competent
sworn documentary evidence in a court under the trustworthy
hearsay exceptions and logic of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the
reasoning and holdings of the Utah Supreme Court and other courts
including federal ones.

For example, as tjie United States Supreme

Court said in Mackey v. Montrym, Id. at p. | 13 and 14 and p. 2619:
[He] is, by reason of his training and experience,
well suited for the role the statute accords him
in the presuspension process. And, as he is
personally subject to civil liability for an
unlawful arrest and to criminal penalties for
willful misrepresentation of th£ facts, he has
every incentive to ascertain accurately and
truthfully report the facts . .j • The risk of

erroneous observation or deliberate
misrepresentation of the facts py the reporting
officer in the ordinary case sefems insubstantial.
Moreover, as this case illustrates, there will

rarely be any genuine dispute a? to the historical
facts providing cause for a suspension.
Not only were the requirements of the residuum rule met through
the competent documentary evidence, but tljiey were also met by the
direct testimonial evidence of the driver^
department, believable or not.
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relied upon by the

Importantly, the driver/petitioner testified.
28.

T. at

Although the driver did not fully agree with the officer's

report, in that he contended he was not in "actual physical
control" of the vehicle, T. at 17 (an issue which has not been
pursued by the petitioner) he did confirm that he was behind the
wheel and that the car "could have been" moving,

T. at 17-19 and

26-27, thus corroborating the officer's admissible sworn report
with "competent", direct testimonial evidence.
In this case, the appellant's testimony at the
administrative hearing, like the reliable documentary evidence,
served to satisfy the requirements of the residuum of evidence
rule and since he could have subpoenaed him and had him present,
due process was granted.
A.

The Presence of the Peace Officer
Was Not Otherwise Required

In support of his second proposition, that the
officer's presence is otherwise necessary to satisfy the
petitioner's interest in cross-examination, the petitioner cites
I.C.C. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 277 U.S. 88 (1913).
The T'ftinsviHe

&

Nashville language, quoted by the petitioner,

seems to require a full-blown trial even though the proceeding is
administrative.

But much more limited proceedings are

constitutionally permissible, and the Louisville & Nashville
language should not be used to guide the driving privilege
suspension cases.
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Two factors immediately distinguish Louisville &
Nashville from the case at hand.

First, ajgencies have been

accorded much greater freedom over the last 70 years since
Louisville & Nashville was decided.

Theirj expertise and

convenience made them a valuable, modern necessity.

Their

desirable qualities would be lost, however |f if every agency
action required a full-blown trial.
Secondly, Louisville & Nashville) involved complex,
nationwide rate making.

The extent of thej hearing required was,

accordingly, more elaborate than that where only two relatively
simple public safety facts and issues are Addressed as in license
suspension cases.
Additionally, Louisville & Nashville has been narrowed
to its facts by the United States Supreme iourt.

In 1973 the

Court, in United States v. Florida East CoAst R. Co., 410 U.S.
224 (1973), a case factually similar to Louisville & Nashville,
held that some railroad rate making could lie accomplished without
the evidentiary hearing it required in Louisville & Nashville,
even though the statute at issue required a "hearing."

The court

distinguished Florida East Coast from Louisville & Nashville
saying that one involved "rulemaking" while the other involved
"adjudication.11

However, the principle law difference between

these cases, as Davis On Administrative Law points out, is that
in Louisville & Nashville nationwide rate daking was the issue.
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While in Florida East Coast only the "specified rates" of a
single railroad were at issue.

K, PaviSr Administrative- Law

Treatise. §§ 12:4, 14:10 (26 ed. 1976).

See also K» PaviSr

Administrative Law Treatise, § 15.2 (1953).
Strangely, today, Louisville & Nashvill.fi is largely
known for its inception of the rule, now accepted nationwide and
in Utah, that the exclusionary rules of evidence do not apply to
administrative agencies.

See Opp Cotton Willis v. Administrator,

312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941), and D&LLZ,

(2d ed.) £ii£na, at § 16:4.

Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 486 (1981) affirmed
that the "technical rule of evidence need not be applied " in
administration proceedings.
The history of Louisville & Nashville illustrates the
trend toward liberalizing administrative proceedings and
accepting agencies as experts in their fields.

Administrative

officers, like the hearing officer which presided in this case,
are experienced in Implied Consent cases, breath testing
machines, and regulations and trained to weigh the evidence
before them and determine the trustworthiness of that evidence.
The trustworthiness of the officer's sworn report is
substantial.

The report was sworn to by the officer and also

double checked and endorsed with the authorized endorsing
signature as required by the statute.

It was received in the

ordinary and regular course of business through regular, routine
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departmental channels, on the department1s own statutorily
required forms.

It appears on its face to be properly sworn to,

verified and notarized.

In other words, tne source of the

information and the circumstances of its preparation indicate its
trustworthiness, acceptability and admissibility upon which the
hearing officer could reasonably and naturally rely.
£nx,

Ballard v.

.sju»£Ar Barney v, CQXI 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978).
There is no absolute right to cross-examination,

particularly in the administrative setting!
have had the officer there.
that purpose.

The driver could

The Department had forms ready for

Murray City v, Hall, supra and infra.

The

trustworthiness of the report nullifies the need for the
officer's presence particularly when the driver has an
opportunity to testify himself.

Thus, in Burkhart Vi Department

of Motor Vehicles, 124 Cal.App.3d 99, 177 Cal.Rptr.. 175 (1981),
the California Court of Appeals held that the California
statutory scheme for suspension clauses and that the officer1 s
hearsay sworn statement could support a firjding even against

conflicting evidence.

The Court pointed out that the officer1s

hearsay report was an official record of the Department and was
made specifically admissible by the statut^

The Court then

pointed out that the petitioner could have called the arresting
officer himself.

The Court's reasoning is persuasive:

The physical presence of the officer at the
hearing would not substantially e nhance the
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reliability of the hearing process. The
officer and the licensee would engage in a
swearing match and cross-examination of the
officer would seldom reveal any weaknesses in
his testimony, simply because the issues are
neither complex nor subtle*
Finally, in reference to the governmental
interest and the fiscal and administrative
burdens involved if additional or substitute
procedures are mandated, we note that
governmental agencies at the state and local
level are in a period of fiscal restraint.

Police manpower resources are finite*

it

does not require the presence of the
arresting officer at every hearing. The
licensee has an absolute right to compel his
attendance if he requests a subpoena, has it
served and pays the statutory fee (§ 14104.5;
Gov.Code, § 68097.2). In the event the
licensee deems the officer's presence
critical to his defense, the burden is
properly placed on him to insure the
officer's attendance. Many licensees may
prefer that the officer not appear, so as to
take his chances on his powers of persuasion
working in the absence of conflicting live
testimony. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 181.
The Utah Supreme Court has also specifically held that even in a
criminal trial the individual's interest in cross-examination
gives say to a trustworthy report balanced against the economic
and administrative burden.

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 at

p. 1321 (Utah 1983).
The circumstances of this case indicate that the DUI
report was trustworthy.
otherwise.

The appellant does not indicate

Because of this the appellant's due process rights

and interest in cross-examination have been satisfied, especially
since the appellant did not make efforts to have the officer
there..
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POINT IV
THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SUBPOENA WITNESSES LACKS MERIT
The petitioner did not attempt to subpoena witnesses or
obtain subpoenas regarding his administrative suspension hearing.
T. at 31.

Because he made no request for subpoenas (blank or

specific) he lacks standing to claim that departmental policy
makes subpoenas unavailable to aggrieved drivers.

However, even

if the petitioner had standing, this claim must fall, for the
department provides reasonable procedures under which relevant
witnesses may be subpoenaed.

(See addendum subpoena form.)

Section 41-2-19.6f Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
provides that "[iln connection with a [license suspension]
hearing the department or its duly authorised agents . . . may
issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the
production of relevant books and papers."

It does not permit the

issuance of innumerable blank subpoenas upon the request of the
driver or his attorney.

However, the statutory authority to

subpoena witnesses and evidence are practical and reasonable, and
prevent neither the acquisition of witnesses or evidentiary
material.
An agency's subpoena power is limited to reasonably
relevant, legal inquiry.

See, e.g., State v. D.R. Johnson Lumber

Co. , 617 P.2d 603 (Or. 1980), State v. Latt^a. 601 P.2d 520 (Wash.
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197 9) . The subpoenas the department may issue in anticipation of
a suspension hearing must be relevant to the fact situation and
issues involved, such as the officer's reason to believe that the
plaintiff was driving under the influence, and, for example, the
plaintiff's driving pattern, the accident, or his performance of
the field sobriety test.
The issues and facts are few and uncomplicated.

The

only witness1 testimony that will usually be pertinent to these
issues is that of the driver and the arresting officer.
Testimony on, perhaps, the driver's normal state of sobriety, or
the arresting officer's character is irrelevant, and due to the
testimony's irrelevancy, issuance of subpoenas for the purpose of
obtaining this sort of information would be beyond the bounds of
the department's authority.

The issuance of blank subpoenas

could potentially draw the department outside of its jurisdiction
and possibly into the criminal area.

Thus, the department, with

its reasonably limited subpoena power, should not issue blank
subpoenas.
Because the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) has not
been adopted in Utah, its provisions are not dispositive.
are, however, illustrative.

They

Section 6(c) of the APA provides:

Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be
issued to any party upon request and, as may
be required by rules of procedure, upon a
statement, on showing of general relevances and
reasonable scope of the evidence sought.
(Emphasis added.)
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As Davis points out, this section was added by Congress to put
private parties on the same footing as the government with
respect to the acquisition of unprivileged information. JL*.
Davis, Treatise on Administrative Law, (1953) 8.15.

However, the

availability of information to private parties is limited.
The words "authorized by law" [in Section
6(c), APA] prevent the provision from
granting power to agencies not otherwise
empowered to issue subpoenas. Trie provision
returns the previous system of permitting an
agency to exercise discretion concerning the
grant of subpoenas on behalf of pro-rate
parties, but only to the extent of na
statement or showing of general r elevance and
reasonable scope." (Footnote omijtted). Id.
Under the APA an agency may and should issue subpoenas,
but only those relevant to the issues befor e the agency*
request for blank subpoenas does not meet the showing of
relevancy requirement.

The same holds true for the issuance of

subpoenas under Section 41-2-19.6.

The sta|tute requires that the

information sought through testimony be rel levant.

The department

is, therefore, not reasonably authorized to| issue blank
subpoenas.
The appropriate procedure would bk for the driver or
his attorney to request the department to subpoena, for example,
the arresting officer.

See Appellant1s Brief, p. 19.

But

neither specific nor even blank subpoenas were requested in this
case.

T. at 31.

In any case had the plaintiff requested that

particular individual, whose testimony would be relevant, be

-37-

subpoenaed, and had the department refused to subpoena the
requested witnesses, the issue would be different.

As it is, the

plaintiff's contention that he should have been issued blank
subpoenas, lacks merit*
CONCLUSION
Statutes are accorded a presumption of validity and
therefore are assumed valid unless they are clearly
unconstitutional.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that

Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20, Utah Code Ann., 1953 (as
amended), are clearly unconstitutional.

Therefore, Utah's new

civil license suspension system should be presumed valid and
upheld.
To test the constitutional validity under the due
process granted, the individual's interest and state's interest
must be weighed against the suspension system itself.

The

individual does have an interest in a continued privilege, but it
is a limited interest, subject to reasonable regulation.

The

license is retained prior to the administrative hearing, only
suspended and only for 90 days, all deprivation subject to
judicial review and appeal.
The State and traveling public have a tremendous
interest.

The effects of DUI have been great, both in terms of

the economy and in terms of human life, pain and suffering.
Therefore, there is a crying need in remedying this problem and
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in remedying it in an efficient way (both fiscally and
administratively) that will guarantee swiflt and sure results.
The risk of erroneous deprivation is invalid because:
1)

The trained officer's uniforjm report is sworn to

and based on reasonable grounds;
2)

The reported information is bhecked before and

after mailing to the Department for inaccuracies and
deficiencies;
3)

The driver has an opportunity for a hearing prior

to any 90 day suspension;
4)

The driver has an opportunity to subpoena

5)

An impartial public official!has discretion to take

witnesses;

into account a wide range of evidence, on t w ° basic simple
issues;
6)

The documentary evidence —

Officer's Sworn DUI

Report Form —• is reliable competent and trustworthy;
7)

The privilege is only suspended for a short three

month period; and
8)

An opportunity for prompt po^t-suspension

meaningful judicial review is available.
Therefore, this statute and system is constitutionally
sufficient especially when considering the state's great interest
in keeping its highways safe.

The Trial Cc|>urt nor the hearing
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examiner were arbitrary or irrational and, therefore, the court
should be affirmed.
DATED this

//

day of November, 1984.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent, first-class, postage prepaid to
JoAnn B. Stringham, McRae & DeLand, 209 East 100 North, Vernal,
TJT 84078.
DATED this

/' /

day of November, 1984.
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Upon the conclusion of such examination the department shall take such action
as may be appropriate and may suspend or revoke the license of such person or
permit him to retain such license, or may issue ja license subject to restriction as
permitted under section 41-2-9. Refusal or neglect of the licensee to submit to such
examination shall be ground for suspension or relocation of his license. * •
(h) No report authorized by section 41-2-124 shall contain any evidence of a
conviction for speeding on an interstate system located in this state if the conviction was for a speed of less than 71 miles per hour and did not result in an accident
unless authorized in writing by the individual whose report is being requested.
(i) The department may suspend the license jjrf a person when the department
has been notified trv a juvenile court that the person has outstanding against him
21 k l l «*n unpaid fine or uncomplied-with restitution reouirement levied bv order
Si £. .Juvenile court, and the suspension shall remain in effect until the department
i§ Notified by the juvenile court that the order hajs been satisfied. No report authorized by section 41-2-12.1 shall contain any evidence of such suspension.
(\) The department may immediately suspend! the license of a person if it has
reason to believe that the person is the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to
which a security is required under Chapter 41 ljf "Title 31; and has operated the
vehicle or permitted it to be operated within thisTstate without the security being
iH effect. The provisions of sections 41-12-17.5 and 41-12-29 with respect to the surrender of license plates and registration of motor. vehicles and the requirement of
proof of financial responsibility apply to persons whose driving privilege is sus
pended under this subsection. If the department jexercises the right of immediate
suspension granted under this subsection (i), the jnotire and.bearing provisions of
subsection (b) apply. A person whose license suspension has been sustained or
whose license has been revoked by the department under this subsection may file
£ petition within SO days after the sustaining of Ithe suspension or the revocation
for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall pe"~governed by the provisions of
section 41-2-20.
I
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History C. 1953, 41-2-19, enacted by L. 1983, ch 183, § 22; 1983, ch. 187, § 3; 1983, ch.
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 4; 192, § 1.
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41-2-19.5. Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving under the influence- The legislature finds and declares that a prjimary purpose of the provisions
in this code that relate to suspension or revocationlof a person's license or privilege
to operate a motor vehicle for driving with a blooq alcohol content above a certain
level or while under the influence of alcohol or any| drug, or combination of alcohol
and any drug, or for refusing to take a chemical test provided for in section
41-6-44.10, is safely protecting persons on roads and highways by quickly removing
from those roads and highways persons who havd shown they are safety hazards
by driving with a blood alcohol content above a Certain level or while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug or by refusing to take a chemical test that complies wit^i the requirements of section
41-6-44.10.
Historv: C. 1953, 41-2-19.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 5.

vict for driving while intoxicated; and providing an effective date.
This ait amends sections 41-2-2, 41-2-20,
and 41-2-28, Utah Code Annotated 1953, secTitle of Act.
An act relating to driving while intoxi- tion 41-2413, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 129, Laws of Utah
cated; establishing standards relating to, last
1981, section 41-2-18, Utah Code Annotated •
penalties for, and procedures to deal with, 1953, as ljast amended by chapter 152, Laws
driving while intoxicated; repealing the sec- of Utah 1979, section 41-2-19, Utah Code
tion which formerly set the absolute mini- Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 9,
mum blood-alcohol content required to con- Laws of Utah 1978, Second Special Session,
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sections 43-2-29 and 41-2-30, Utah Code amended by chapter 2, Lawsl of Uuh 1980,
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter section 73-18-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
83, Laws of Utah 1967, section 41-6-43.10, as last amended by chapter 183, Laws of
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended Utah 1977, and section 76-5-207, Utah Code
by chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957, section Annotated 1953, as last amenped by chapter
41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 63, Laws of Utah 1981; exacts sections
amended by chapter 46, Laws of Utah 1982, 41-2-19.5 and 41-2-19.6, Utah 4ode Annotated
sections 41-6-44.3 and 41-6-44.5, Utah Code 1953; repeals and reenacts section 41-6-43,
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 243,
Laws of Utah 1979, section 41-6-44.10, Utah Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter chapter 242, Laws of Utah 1979: and repeals
126, Laws of Utah 1981, section 41-22-14, section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by as last amended by chapter 4,| Laws of Utah
chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1971, section 1982, Second Special Session. — Laws 1983,
63-43-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last ch.99.
41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for officer's request —
Taking license — Report to department — Procedure by department — Suspension. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person
may be violating or has violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, in connection
with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a chemical test to
be administered in compliance wilb the standards set forth in section 4J-6-44.10.
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to
a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient t<>
| render the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension 0r revocation
of the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
I
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a blood
alcohol content of .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, based on
reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person
is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing admiiistration of
the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the
department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's
privilege or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf
of the department he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit,
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 daysi and supply
to the driver, on a form to be approved by the department, basic (information
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation issued
by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, serve ialso as the
temporary license.
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department within five
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicating the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's!determination that the person has violated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding
the person's violation of section 41-6-44. Each such report shall be Ion a form
approved by the department and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equivalent or by a person authorized by him, other than the officer serving the notice.
(5) Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30-day ficense, the
department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 30 days
after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request must
be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance of the 30-cjlay license.
A hearing, if held, shall be before the department in the county in whkhj the arrest
occurred, unless the department and the person agree that the hearing rnay be held
in some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope ^hall cover
the issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe jthe person
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to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of secjtion 41-6-44, whether tne
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any. In connection
with a hearing the department or its duly authorized agent may administer oaths
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of
relevant books and papers. One or more members of the department may conduct
the hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before |any number of the members of the department shall be as valid as if made after |a hearing before the full
membership of the department Aiter the hearing, the (department shall order,
either that the person's license or privilege to drive be Suspended or that it not
be suspended. A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this subsection, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning on th«| 31st day after the date
of the arrest A second or subsequent suspension under ithis subsection shall be
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after) the date of arrest The
department shall assess against a person, in addition to! any fee imposed under
subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving
privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court decision
that the suspension .was not proper. A person whose license has been suspended
by the department under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after
the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if hel^t, shall be governed by
the provisions of section 41-2-20.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L
1983, ch. 99, § 6.

41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, relocation or suspension
— Scope of review. Any person denied a license or whose license has been canceled, suspended or revoked by the department except wh^re such cancellation or
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless the suspension
occurred pursuant to section 41-2-19.6 shall have the right jto file a petition within
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a courtj of record in the county
wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby Rested with jurisdiction
and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ien cays' written notice
to the department? t&i thereupon 4# 4«Jte tostim
examine 4»fc6 -the facts
e? the efrse «*e fce determine whether the petitioner is e&$
titled fcs fe license er is
subjectfeecancellation, suspension <a? revocation *A license
'|under4he provisions «ei
tfes set The court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of tlhe record to determine
whether or not the department's decision was arbitrary- or capricious.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, §20; 1935, ch. 47,
§ 2; C. 1943, 57-4-23; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 7.

41-2-21. New license after revocation. (1) Any person kvhose license has been
revoked under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or Receive any new license
until the expiration of one year from the date such former license was revoked
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-19. Licenses which have been
revoked may not be renewed, but application for a new license must be filed as
provided in section 41-2-8, and a license so issued shall b$ subject to all of the
provisions of an original license. The department shall not ^rant the license until
an investigation of-ihe character, abilities and habits of thel driver has been made
to indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him the privilege of using the
highways.
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's e* chauffeur's license to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this

>E
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41-6-44.2.
41-6-44.3.
41-6-44.5.

Repealed.
Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence.
Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving under the influence
or with a prohibited blood alcohol content — Weight
41-6-44.8. 3v$unicipal attorneys authorized to prosecute for driving while license suspended
or revoked.
|
41-6*44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Refusal to allow —
Warning, report, revocation of license — Court action on revocation — Person
incapable of refusal — Results of test available — |Who may give test — Evi-"
dence.
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by category I peace officers.
41-6-43. Local o r d i n a n c e s to be consistent with code* (1) An ordinance
adopted by a local authority that governs a person's driving or being in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under
the influence oi alcohol or any drug or the combined infiujence of alcohol and any
drug, or that governs, in relation to any of those matter^, the use of a chemical
test or chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions, or penalties or that governs
any combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the provisions in this
code which govern those matters.
j
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving, or
driving a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be consistent with the provisions of this code vfhicb govern those matters.
History: C. 19SS, 41-6-43, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 11.

Compiler's Notes[
LaWc i9g3, ch. 39, § 11 repealed old section
41-6-43 (L. 1979, |ch. 242, § 12), relating to
powers of local authorities, and enacted Dew
section 41-6-43.

41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide — Death occurring within one year — Penalty — Revocation of license or privilege to drive. {&)! (1} When the death of
any person ensues within one year as a proximate result c}f injury received by the
driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety bf others, the person so
operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicidej
(fe) (2) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of not less than
$100 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment
(e) (3) The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homicide.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10, enacted by L.
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch.
99,112.
41*6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or with high blood
alcohol content — Criminal punishment — Arrest wjthdut warrant — Suspension or revocation of license. ^ (1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided
in subsection (4) ef this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08%
21 greater by weight or who is under the influence of alcohol? or ^eite is under
the influence *t any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or
be in actual physical control of *&? a vehicle within this state. The fact that e^y
a person charged with violating this section is or has beei legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug she& does not constitute a defense againsi any charge of violating
this section.
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ffe}—ift e w criminal prosecution fer e violation ef subsccti&R {*•) M tirts section
relating te driving e vehielc while under t h e influence ef alcohol, 4? 4R efty t m l
s«4t er proceeding arising eet ef eets alleged t e have been ceirrguttod |fe¥ £•**¥ person
while efiving er «* actual physical control ex e vehicle while undcrj tire influence
e? alcoher, the amount e# alcohol «r the person's blood e t the tote alleged es shown
fe¥ chemical analysis ef the person's blood, breath, e? other feodily substance eheri
grve r4se *e t*?e following presumptions:
(3-)—if there wee e t thet t*fi*e &r&6 per eeftt er- iees by weight ef alcohol fe tbe
person's blood,' t t shall be presumed thet tire person wee s e t under tire influence
ef alcohei;
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eest by weight ef akohol t» the person's blood, seeh feet shall ftet gtve ?4se 4e
€tfty picoumption t h e t t h e person -wtts er -w^s **et under 4be •influence ef alcohol,
bet seeh feet «rey be considered witb other competent evidence «jt determining
whether tbe person wee under the influence eg alcohol;
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person'? blood, k shall be pre sumoc that the person wee t*nder tbe influence e?
alcohol;
% •
(4j—?be foregoing provisions%ef tbie subsection ebetl fret be eonstrqed es limiting
tbe introduction ef e^y other competent evidence bearing upon |tbe question
whether e? ftet tbe person wes under tbe influence ef akohol.
I
(tr) (2) Percent bv weight ol alcohol in the blood shall be based \poii p a m s oi
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
W {3} Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation! of subsection
(1) of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 60 days
nor more than six months, or by a fine of S299, or by both such fine ^nd imprison*
ment; provided except that i » if the event eeeb person ebeH have ijias inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated ptH the vehicle in a negligent manner, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than one year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of
not more than $1,000. For the purposes of this section, the standard!of negligence
shall be is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care
which ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like ^r similar circumstances.
I
(e) (4) In addition to the penalties provided herein for in subsection (3), the
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than twe 48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving
in tbe drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in e* alcohol rehabilitat*e& facility a community-service work program for not less than two nor more
than 10 days er and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in thg communityservice work program, order the person to obtain treatment e t e * participate jn
an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(f) (5} Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction under
this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance
with subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided
for in subsection 4& (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not |ess than twe
48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in e« alcohol rehabilitation facility
£ community-service work program for not less than 10 nor more than 30 days
ef and, in addition "to the jail sentence or the work in the communifrhservice work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series
^ a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility and the court may, in its discretion,
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. Upon a
subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction und^r this section
64
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or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted ml compliance with subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, m addition to the penalties provided for m sunsection (4) (3), impose a mandator jail sentence of not less man 30 nor more than
90 days with emphasis on serving in the drhnk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in «* alcohol rehabilitation facility a community-service work project
for not less than 30 nor more than 90 days ^kts and, in additil on to the jail sentence
or work in the community-service work program, order the person to oEtam treatment at an "alcohol rehabilitation facility. No portion of any Sentence imposed pta*suant fee under subsection {4) (3) shall be suspended «er oh all and the convicted
person shall not be eligible for parole or probation until such time as tfee an^ sentence providccTSer ta *&*s subsection imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or
a local ordinance similar to this section ado'pteFln compliance with subsection
41-6-43 (1) shall not be terminated and the department shall not reinstate any
license suspended or revoked as a result "of such convictioiL if it is a second or
subsequent such conviction witKuTfive vears. until and uniesj tne convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department thitTU fines and fees,
including fees for restitution, and reliaSilitation costs* assessed against the person,
have been paid.
\
(6) The provisions £n subsections (4) and (5) that require! a sentencing court to
order a convictea person to participate in an assessment anq educational series jat
a licensed alcohol rehabiEtation facility, "^obtain, in the discretion of the court,
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or "obtain, mandatorily, treatment
at an alcoliol rehabilitation facility, or do any combination hi those things, apply
to a conviction for a violation of section 41-6-45 that qualifies zz z prior offense
uncTer subsection (T), so as to require the court to render tne |same order regarding
education or treatment at an alcohol "rehabilitation facility, tbr both, in connection
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under section Til-6-45 that Qualifies
as a prior offense uiiBer subsectionT?), as he would renckr in connection with
applying respectively, the first, seco'nq, or suFseouent conviction reouirements of
subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). For purposes of determining whether a conviction
under section 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction junder subsection (7),
1§ a first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsectipn, a previous conviction under either section 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior conviction. Anv alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or oth^r education program
provided for in this section must be approved by the department of social services.
tf) W) (^ When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guiljty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of section 41*6-45 or of an ordinance enajcted pursuant to subsection 41-6-43(b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, £n original charge of
a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the Record a factual basis
for the plea, including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense.
The statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which jshow whether or not
there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant pr*e? *e #*t cjcccptancc «ef before
accepting the plea offered pursuant *e under this subsectionj of the consequences
of a violation of section 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accept^ the defendant's plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating section 41-6-4$, and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or! drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, I the resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph l<4) subsection (5) of
this section.
(c) The court shall notify the department t£ raotor vehicles of each conviction
of section 41-6-45, which shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph
tf) subsection (5) of this section.
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(&} (S) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a perscjn for a violation
of this section when seek the violation is coupled with an accident or collision in
which seek the person is involved and when eeefe the violation nas, in fact, been
committed, although not in his presence, if the olticer has reasonable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by s**efe the person,
(i) (9) The department of public safety shall revoke suspend for a period of 90
days tEe operator's t* chauffeurs license of any person convicted'tor'the first Time
under subsection (1) of this section^ and shall revoke for one veg>r the license of
any person otKerwise convicted under this section, except that the jdepartment may
subtract from any suspension period the number of dayslor wEijch a license was
previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is based upofu
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, £34; C. 1943, than 10 nor more than 3([) days in the first
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, §1; 1957, ch. 75, §1; sentence of subset, (f); added "or to obtain
1967, ch. 88, 12; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch. treatment at as alcohol rehabilitation facil268, §3; 1979, ch. 243, §1; 1981, ch. 63, i ^ — i ^ t o . the first sentence of subset, (f);
1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch. increased the neriods in tie second sentence
103, § 1; 1983f ch. 183, § 33.
0 f subsec. .(f) from not less; than 10 nor more
Compiler's Notes.
than 30 ^ a v s *° DOt ^ ess than 30 nor more
Laws 1983, ch. 183, discontinuing separate t h a r i ^0 days; added -plus] obtain treatment
classification for chauffeur's license, is effec- * l * E / i c o h o 3 rehabilitation facility to the
tive January 1,1984/ *
second sentence of subiec. (f); inserted
The 1982 amendment increased the mini- subsec (g);reoesignated farmer subsecs. (f)
mum term in subsec (d) from 30 to 60 days; a n d W a s * ) £ n d « •
deleted "not less than S100 nor more than" P£ f fn e c t l.v e una I e
before "$299" in subsec. (d); inserted subsec.
(e); redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f);
Section 2 of Laws 1982, ch. 46 provided
increased the period of work from not less that the act should take effect upon approval,
than two nor more than 10 days to not less Approved February 19,1981
41-6-44JL RepealedRepeal,
blood alcohol content of .10% or higher, was
Section 41-6-4^2 (L. 1973, ch. 80, § 2; 1982 repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 21.
(2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2), relating to driving with
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. (1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of
training.
•
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person
was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content e£ .1091 trf greater statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events
to prove t h a t the analysis was made and accuracy tri the instrument were made
pursuant fee used was accurate, according to standards established in subsection
(1) shall be admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subjection (1) and
the provisions conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there &£& fee is a presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation f^r introduction
of the evidence is unnecessary.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 14.
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41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in [actions for driving under
the influence or with a prohibited blood alcohol consent — Weight. (1) In any
action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was driving
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
with a blood alcohol content e? .1091 ©f greater statutorily prohibited, the results
of a chemical test or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be admissible
as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged driving or
actual physical control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the time of the
alleged driving or actual physical control shall be presumed to be not less than
the level of the alcohol determined to be in the blood by t|he chemical test.
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two hou^s after the alleged driving
or actual physical control, the test result shall be admissible as evidence of the
person's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged (driving or actual physical
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight shall be given to the
result of the test
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall nolt fee construed es 1;siting
fcke consideration trf application hy &tt trier t? te&t e£ 4fat presumptions eer forth
i» section 41 G 44., «er shallfcfeeyprevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol level at tl^e time of the alleged driving or actual physical control.
Historv: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15.

41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to projsecute for driving while
license suspended or revoked. Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which consist
of the person driving while his operator's or chauffeur's license is suspended or
revoked for a violation of section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with
the requirements of section 41-6-43, section 41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea
bargain after having been originally charged with violating one of more of those
sections or ordinances, may be prosecuted by attorneys 0f cities and towns as well
as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in th}s code to prosecute those
alleged violations.

a
f

History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 102, § 1.

f

Title of Act.
An act relating to prosecution of alleged
violations of section 41-2-28; empowering city

i
e
i

attorneys of cijties and towns to prosecute
those alleged violations.
This act enacts section 41-6-44.8, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. — LEWS 1983, ch. 102.

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Refusal
to allow — Warning, report, revocation of license — Court action on revocation — Person incapable of refusal — Results of test available — Who may
give test — Evidence. •£&) (1] Any person operating a rjnotor vehicle in this state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether ije was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood Alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, an^ drug, or combination of
alcohol' and any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, provided £te& st*eh so long as
the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having
grounds to believe st*db that person to have been drivingj or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited.
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and
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any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which of
the aforesaid tests shaTTbe administered.
No person; who has been requested pursuant fce under this section to submit to
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to select
the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a pea^e officer to
arrange for any specific test shall is not fee a defense with regard to taking a test
requested by a peace officer **er an? it shall not be a defense in any criminal, civil
or administrative proceeding resulting from a persons refusal to submit to the
requested test or tests.
1
(fe) (2]f If ssefe the person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the cheb-icai tests
provided for in subsection {&) (1) of this section and refuses to submit to streh the
chemical test or tests, st*efe the person shall be warned by a peace officer requesting
the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation
of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless saek the
person immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a pfeace officer
be administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall submit a sworn
report within five days after the date of the arrest that he had ground^ to believe
the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control pi a motor
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited or w|hile under
the influence of alcohol.or any drug or combination of alcohol and ai^y drug as
detailed in section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused to submit to &
! chemical
test or tests as set forth in subsection {&) (1) of this section. Within 20 jdays after
receiving a sworn report from a peace officer to the effect that such the person
has refused a chemical test or tests the department shall notify seek the person
of a hearing before the department If at s«*d that hearing the departrrjent determines that the person was granted the right to submit to a chemical te^t or tests
and refused to submit to such the test or tests, or if s**eh the person fails! to appear
before the department as required in the notice, the department shall Revoke for
one year his license or permit to drive. The department shall also .assess against
the person, in addition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-8 (7), a fee of $25,
which must be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated^ to cover
administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an
unappealed court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subseiction that
the revocation was not proper. Any person whose license has been revoked by the
department under the provisions of this section shall have the right to §\e a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the distHct court
in the county in which &zth the person s k ^ reside resides. £wfe The court is
hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall fee k* ee^f *& set the matteJ[ for trial
de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department and thereupon *e tjake testimony and examine into the facts of the case and *e determine whether the
petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this eetlchapter.
^ ill Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition Rendering
him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or tests! shall be
deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in subsection w (1) of
this section, and the test or tests may be administered whether such person has
been arrested or not
(4) (4} Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of ^uch test
or tests shall be made available to him.
I
£e) (5) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorised
under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer can v^ithdraw
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. This
limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Arjy physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under subsection
26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of bl^od from
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any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of
this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall
be immune from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such
test is administered according to standard medical practice.
&} (6) The person to be tested may, at his own (expense, have a physician of
his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such
additional test shall not affect admissability of the repults of the test or tests taken
-at the direction of a peace officer, nor preclude norj delay the test or tests,to be
taken at the direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent.
to the test or tests administered at the direction of a ij>eace officer.
(g) {7} For the purpose of determining whether jto submit to a chemical test
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the j right to consult an attorney
nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, physician or other person
present as a condition for the taking of any test
$*} ill ^ a P62^01* under arrest- refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests
under the provisions of this section,, evidence of refuel shall be admissible in any
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of a|cts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any
drug.
. History; C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16.

occupants. arcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645
P 2d 651.
Proceeding jto revoke license for failure to
Actual physical control.
submit to jtest.
To establish actual physical control of a
vehicle for purposes of this section, it is
Driver's license revocation proceeding for
unnecessary' to show actual intent to control. failure to submit to a requested chemical test
the vehicle; intent to control a vehicle may be " requires projof only by a preponderance of
inferred from the performance of those acts the evidence! Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982).
which constitute actual physical control. 645 P 2d 651.1
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651.
At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license
There was an adequate showing that for failure to| submit to a requested chemical
motorist was in actual physical control of a test, departrrjent of public safety has the burmotor vehicle where motorist occupied the den to show I arrested person was driving or
driver's position behind the steering wheel of in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
a motor vehicle with possession of the igni- in addition %o showing that the arresting
tion key and with apparent ability to start officer had!grounds to believe that the
and move the vehicle; fact that vehicle was arrested per$on was under the influence; the
blocked by a fence and another vehicle and same evidentiary burden must be met in a
could be moved only a few feet did not pre- trial de novo] in the district court. Garcia v.
clude a finding of actual physical control. Schwendimad (1982) 645 P 2d 651.
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651.
The "actual physical control" language of Law Reviews.
Hansen v. Owens — Expansion of the Priv..this section should be read as intending to
prevent intoxicated drivers from entering ilege against (Self-incrimination to Unknown
their vehicles except as passengers or passive Limits, 1981 l|Jiah L Rev. 447.

41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by category I peace officers. The legislature finds that it is contrary to the sjafery of the public to leave
vehicles unattended on public roads.
(1) If a category 1 peace officer arrests or cites the ariver of a vehicle for violating sections 41-6-43, 41-6-44, 41-6-44.2, or 41-6-44.10, the officer shaD seize and
impound the vehicle.
I
(2) Any such officer who impounds a vehicle underr this section shall remove,
or cause the vehicle to be removed, to the nearest accessible s*fe*e impound yard
that meets the standards set by rule by the state department of motor vehicles,
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STATE

OF

UTIAH

BEFORE THE DEPARIMEMT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
OF1CE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES

SUBPOENA
In the Matter of the
Driving Privileges of:

File No.
All expanses incurred by the
service of this subpoena will
be paid by the defendant.

Defendant

1 £ STATE OF UTAH Sencs Greetings to

IN THE ABOVE hATTER At© BY AUTHORITY t)F UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
Title 41, as amended, V£ OTWAND YOU, That all lingular business and
excuses being.laid aside, you appear and attend before a Hearing Officer
as assigned by the DepartrTent of Public Safety <bf the State of Utah,
at the following location: _____
•the

on
o!clock

day of

, A-D. 19

, at

.M. then and there to testify in the above-entitled matter new

pending before the Department # on* behalf of
for the following reason
and that you bring vath you and then and there produce the following described documents, reports, books, and records, to-wi1
Disobedience and failure
to attend iray be punished as a contenpt upon request to the Courts.

•WITNESS: THE DEPART7€NT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, m and for the
STATE OF UTAH t h i s

day of

, A.D. 19

Authorized Signature
DRIVER LICENSE SERIVCES

.

